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The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee batik when lie makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An analysis of Sec. I shows that The Bouncing Checks Law penalizes two (2) distinct acts: First, making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does riot have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank; and, second, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) clays from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank). In the first paragraph, the drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the check at the time of its issuance, while in the second paragraph, the drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within ninety (90) clays from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, the offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit.

The check involved in the first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time, while that involved in the second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when issued.’1 Under the first offense, the ninety (90) — day presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of the second offense.’2 From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that petitioner is being prosecuted for violation of the first paragraph of the offense.

Petitioner asserts that she could not be prosecuted for violation of BP 22 on the simple ground that the subject check was presented 166 days after the date stated thereon. She cites Sec. 2 of BP 22 which reads —

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. —

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (9O days from the date of check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5,) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Petitioner interprets this provision to mean that the ninety (90) — day presentment period is an element of the offense punished in 13P 22. She asseverates that “for a maker or issuer of a check to be covered by B.P. 22, the check issued by him/her is one that is dishonored when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date of the check. If the dishonor occurred after presentment for payment beyond the ninety (90)-day period, no criminal liability attaches; only a civil case for collection of sum of money maybe filed, if warranted. To bolster this argument, she relies on the view espoused by Judge David G. Nitafan in his treatise.

Although evidentiary in nature, section 2 of the law must be taken as furnishing an additional element of the offense defined in the first paragraph of section 1 because it provides for the evidentiary fact of “knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit” which is an element of the offense defined in said paragraph; otherwise said provision of section 2 would be rendered without meaning and nugatory. The rule of statutory construction is that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be constructed as contradicting each other. The same section cannot be deemed to supply an additional element for the offense under the second paragraph of section 1 because the 90-day presentment period is already a built-in element in the definition of said offense.

We are not convinced. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be deterrence or knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit. Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period. The deliberations on the passage of BP 22 (then known as Cabinet Bill No. 9) between the author, former Solicitor Estelito P. Mendoza and Bataan Assemblyman Pablo Roman prove insightful —

MR. ROMAN: xxxx Under Section 1, who is the person who may be liable under this Section? Would it be the maker or the drawer? I-Tow about the endorser, Mr. Speaker? MR. MENDOZA: Liable. MR. ROMAN: The endorser, therefore under Section 1 is charged with the duty of knowing at the time he endorses and delivers a check... MR. MENDOZA: If the endorser is charged for violation of the Act then the fact of knowledge must be proven by positive evidence because the presumption of knowledge arises only against the maker or the drawer. It does not arise as against endorser under the following section. MR. ROMAN: But under Section 1, it says here: “Any person who shall make or draw or utter or deliver any check.” 

The preposition is disjunctive, so that any person who delivers any check knowing at the time of such making or such delivery that the maker or drawer has no sufficient funds would be liable under Section 1. MR. MENDOZA: That is correct Mr. Speaker. But, asl said, while there is liability even as against endorser, for example, the presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds arises only against the maker or drawer under Section 2. MR. ROMAN: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is true; however, under Section 1, endorsers of checks or bills of exchange would find it necessary since they may be charged with the knowledge at the time they negotiate bills of exchange they have no sufficient funds in the bank or depository. MR. MENDOZA: In order that an endorser may be held liable, there must be evidence showing that at the time he endorsed the check he was aware that the drawer would not have sufficient funds to cover the check upon presentation. The evidence must be presented by the prosecution. however, if the one charged is the drawer, then that evidence need not be presented by the prosecution because that fact would be established by presumption under Section 2.

An endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under BP 22, even though the Presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90) days from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain probable cause to file the information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by certiorari. Certainly, petitioner is not left in a lurch as the prosecution must prove knowledge without the benefit of the presumption, and she may present whatever defenses are available to her in the course of the trial.

The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.’5 Applying this analogy to the case at bar, knowledge of insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such knowledge.

The elements of the offense under BP 22 are (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full UOfl its presentment; and (c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.’6 ninety (90)-day period is not among these elements. Section 2 of BP 22 is clear that a dishonored check presented within the ninety (90)-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates prima-facie Presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check, the payment of which was subsequently refused for insufficiency of funds.’7 The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.