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The presumption in Sec. 2 is not a conclusive presumption that forecloses or precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. 18 Neither does the term, prima facie evidence preclude the presentation of other evidence that may sufficiently prove the existence or knowledge of insufficiency of funds or lack of credit. Surely, the law is not so circumscribed as to limit proof of knowledge exclusively to the dishonor of the subject check when presented within the prescribed ninety (90) day period.

It is worth reiterating that courts will not normally interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion to file a criminal case when there is probable cause to do so. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.’9 The prosecutor has ruled that there is probable cause in this case, and we see no reason to disturb the finding.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 1999 which dismissed the petition for review questioning the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region IV, dated 22 April 1999, and its order dated 31 August 1999 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED,

Elements for violation of The Bouncing Checks Law

The elements of the offense under BP 22 are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for other payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit would have been dishonored or would have been dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficiency funds.—

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Intention of Section 2, BP 22

Section 2, BP 22 was intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose the admissibility of other evidence that may also improve such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within ninety (90) clays from the date stated is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Whether such evidence is sufficient to sustain Probable cause to file the information is addressed to the sound discretion of the City Prosecutor and is a matter not controllable by certiorari.

The case Domagsang vs. Court of Appeals, (347 SCRA 76). In this case, the Supreme Court held that: “There is deemed to be prima-facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. Moreover, “while, indeed Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state the matter of dishonor be in writing, however, with Section 3 of the law, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law — the Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require the act to be punished there under not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise than accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The decision follows. Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, of having violated I3atas Pambansa (“B.P.”) Big. 22 (Anti-Bouncing Check Law), on eighteen (18) counts, and sentenced to “suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for each count (eighteen 1J8] counts).” Petitioner was likewise “ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P573,800.00” The judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 18497), was affirmed in (toto by the appellate court.

It would appear that petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank this reason: “Account closed.” r1he complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand.

On 08 May 1992, Criminal Case No. 92-4465 was lodged against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Makati. The Information read: “That on or about 24th day of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this 1-lonorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and issue to complainant Ignacio I-I. Garcia, Jr., to apply on account or for value the dated check/described below:

“said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) (lays from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

“CONTRARY TO LAW”

Subequent information's, docketed Criminal Cases No. 92- 4066 to No. 92-4482, inclusive, similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 92-4466 to No. 90-4482, inclusive, similarly worded as in Criminal Case NO. 92-4465 except as to the dates, the number, and the amounts of the checks hereunder itemized — “Check Number Dated/Postdated Amount.

were also filed against petitioner. The cases were later consolidated and jointly tried following the “not guilty” plea of petitioner when arraigned on 02 November 1992. On 07 September 1993, petitioner filed a demurer to the evidence, with leave of court, premised on the absence of a demand letter and that the checks were not issued as payment but as evidence of indebtedness of petitioner or as collaterals of the loans obtained by petitioner. Opposed by the prosecution, the demurrer was denied by the trial court. In the hearing of 17 February 1994, petitioner, through counsel, waived her right to present evidence in their defense. Relying solely then on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the lower court rendered judgment convicting petitioner. The decision, as heretofore stated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 15 February 1999. Reconsideration was also denied in the resolution, dated 09 July 1999, of the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition where petitioner raised the following issues for resolution by the Court — “1. Whether or not an alleged verbal demand to pay any sufficient to convict herein petitioner for the crime of violation of B.P. Big. 22; “2. Whether or not the 1-lonorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court, on the ground that a written notice of dishonor is not necessary in a prosecution for violation of B.P. BIg. 22, contrary to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572; (and) “3. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering the alleged written demand letter, despite failure of the prosecution to formally offer the same.