Force

Force as a necessary element of the crime of rape, is to be taken in its ordinary acceptation. It means common physical force and fear of life or bodily harm, so that one is unable to make resistance (David v. State, 39 S.W. 356, 63 Ark. 478).

The force necessary to constitute rape need not be actual physical force, but fear, fright or coercion (State vs. Thompson, 40 S.E. 620). It may mean threatened force or violence if the female does not comply (65 AmJur. 2d 764). It also includes intimidation (King v. Commonwealth, 20 S.S. 224, 225, 14 Ky. Law, Report 254).

While force is a necessary ingredient in the commission of rape, no particular amount of it is necessary, nor is it essential that it should create a reasonable apprehension of death, if the female on whom it was committed had reason to consider resistance dangerous or even absolutely useless (People v. Jeanor, 23 Ill. 2d 257, 178 NE 2d).

“It is a doctrine well-established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of rape, it is not necessary that the force employed in ccomplisli. jag it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force uscd by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view (United States vs. Villarosa, 4 Phil.434; People vs. Sarile, 71 Phil. 593; People vs. Gan 46 SCR4 667).

Degree of Force Required

The degree of force required to constitute rape is relative depending upon the particular circumstances, but in any case it must be sufficient to subject and put the dissenting woman within the power of the man and thus enable him to have carnal knowledge of her notwithstanding good-faith resistance on her part (Prokov vs. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28 NW 2d 200, 172 ALR 916).

“The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. What is essential is that the act was accomplished against the *ill of the aggrieved person, and in spite of her resistance.” (U.S. vs. Villarosa, supra; People vs. Momo, 56 Phil. 86; People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320; 75 CJS 476).

In rape, force need not be irresistable. It need not be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistable is beside the point (People vs. Momo, supra; see also People vs. Villarosa, 174 SCRA 70).

“Force to be attendant as to make the sexual act the crime of rape, it need not be irresistible. It is enough that the force used is such as would make possible the consummation of the desire for an intercourse, considering the age of the parties, their sizes, strength and relation to each other.” (People vs. Tejada, 107 SCRA 176).

It is not even necessary in rape that the offender in using fbrce should be armed with a weapon to intimidate the womah. The use of a deadly weapon serves only to increase the penalty (People vs. Sato, 163 SCRA 602).

“The victim need not kick, bite, hit, slap or scratch with her fingernails the offender so that she may successfully claim that she has been raped. It is enough that the coition is taken against her will, explicit and persistent,

for the absence of the consent at the initial stage of the coitus is converted into a tacit assent when the woman contributes to its consummation with her quietude and passivity (U.S. vs. De Bios, 8 Phil. 270). It is sufftcient that the carnal knowledge is done after the woman yields because of authentic apprehension and real fear of immediate death or great bodily harm.” (People vs. Dolores, CA.GR No. 10065.R, August 23, 1957).

In the rape of a daughter, the degree of force or intimidation need not be the same as where the parties are not related to each other (People vs. Navarette, 101 SCRA 394).

Proof of Force

Where the offense charged is rape through force, there must be a showing of compulsion being resorted to and coercion employed. The element of voluntariness must be lacking. If there be an indication of willingness, even if halfhearted, the complaint must be dismissed (People vs. Joven SCRA 126; People vs. Lopez, SCRA 1216).

The force and violence must be proven by clear and conclusive evidence (U.S. vs. De Dios, supra). Thus, the accepted rule in rape cases is that the element of force must be proven by clear and conclusive evidence; otherwise, there is reason to suspect the act was committed with consent (U.S. vs. Flores, 25 Phil. 262).

Intimidation

The crime of rape can be committed even if no force is used. Intimidation is sufficient (People vs. Garciness, 57 SCRA 653).

Intimidation is the act of deterring a person by threats (the New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary). It consists in causing or creating a fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense of mental distress in view of risk or evil that may be impending really or in imagination (People vs. Marco, 12, C.A.R. (2s) 383, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 edition). It includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol (People vs. Garciness, supra). Thus, rape is committed where intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety (People vs. Aruego, 181 SCRA 344).

“Appellant’s contention that the prosecution did not prove that he used force in having carnal knowledge of Rosella does not mean that no rape was committed. The crime can be committed by employing intimidation. Rosella was thirteen years, four months and twenty-nine days old at the time. She was raped. She was an immature teenager. She could easily be coerced or cowed by a big old farmer and former security guard x x x. The case is not far removed from that of an eleven-year old girl with whom voluntary carnal intercourse is considered rape (People vs. Garciness, supra).

Resistance

To render the carnal act as rape, it is necessary that it must have been committed against the resistance of the woman (People vs. Nazworth, 152 Cal. 583, 49 P711). Resistance establishes two elements — carnal knowledge by force by one of the parties and nonconsent by the other (65 AmJur 2d 764).

Resistance must be manifest and tenacious. Mere initial resistance is not enough (People vs. Lazo, 45 OG 1356). Resistance by acts and not by mere words is required (Mills vs. United States, 164 US 644).

“It is generally held that the resistance required depends on the parties’ relative strength (People v. Ford, 81 Cal. Pa 2d 580), the degree of force manifested (People v. MenU, 104 Cal. Pa 2d 257), the fear instilled in the victim (Jazel v. State, 221 Hid 364), and all other circumstances dependent upon the facts of the case (State v. Dizon, 47 Hawaii 444). But it is important that her resistance must be in good faith, and not feigned” (Kidd v. State, 97 Olda Crim 455, 266 P 2d 992).

Merely trying to resist the alleged sexual assault is not a basis for conviction. Mere attempt without actual resistance would not be sufficient basis for a finding of rape (People vs. Lacuna, 7 SCRA 364).

“It must be noted from the foregoing that complainant did not offer any resistance or shout for help against the alleged sexual assaults. She merely tried to resist. Since complainant did not offer any resistance or vocal protestations, there can be no basis or support for a conviction for rape (People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473). If there was any resistance, it was alleged in general terms which likewise cannot suffice to sustain a conviction (People vs. Ching Suy Siong, L-6174, Feb. 28, 1955). Where the offense charged is rape through force, the element of voluntaries must be lacking. If there is an indication of willingness even if half-hearted, the complaint must be dismissed. (People vs. Joven, L-36022, May 22, 1975; 64 SCRA 126).

When some degree of hesitation is shown by the woman or that she had contributed in some way to the realization of the act, there is no rape (Viada as quoted in U.S. vs. de Dios, 8 Phil. 279; People vs. Castro, 84 Phil. 118).