CHAPTER III

PERSONS LIABLE FOR RAPE

General Statement

The crime of rape can be committed directly only by a male person who has sufficient mental capacity and physically capable of doing it (75 CJS 466). It camiot be committed directly by a woman, although she can be held liable for it (State v. Fisherty, 146 A, 7, 128 Mo 141).

The Husband

A husband cannot be guilty of actual rape upon his wife (People vs. Pizzura, 211 Mich 71, 178 SW 235, 10 ALR 403), nor of an attempt to have sexual intercourse with her forcibly and against her will. The reason is that when the woman assumed the marriage relations she gave her body and irrevocable consent to sex with the husband under all circumstances which the law will not permit her to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense (Frazier vs. State, 48 Tex Crim 142, 86 SW 754). This rule applies even where the marriage is voidable as when the girl is under age (People vs. Pizzura, supra).

Where there is legal separation, however, the husband who forces his wife to submit to carnal act can be guilty of rape. This is so because legal separation entitles the spouses to live separately from each other, although their marriage bonds are not severed (Art. 63, Family Code of the Philippines).

The rule of no-rape in marriage has been declared “anachronistic and offensive fiction and quite unacceptable in these modern times” by the House of Lords, the highest court of appeals of London.

Where the husband forces his wife to have intercourse with another man, he can be guilty of rape (State v. Blackwell, 241 or 528, 407 P2d 617). The other man may be acquitted (State v. Haines, 51 Le Ann 731, 25 So 372).

Plainly, where it appears that the intercourse with the• wife was accomplished by a man other than the husband, and that the latter procured it to be done, or assisted the man in its execution, the husband can be guilty of rape. (People vs. Damien, 28 Iii 2d 464, 193 NE 2d 25; Cody v, State (Okia Cri) 361).

“The view is that a husband is guilty of rape on his wife as a principal where to secure evidence for a divorce he makes an agreement with another person that the latter shall be caught in the act of sexual intercourse with her and he is present and witnesses a rape on her by such person and does nothing to prevent it. It has been said the he would be guilty of the crime in such case even if he Were not 1)reseut and intended that the intercourse should be accomplished by consent and not by force (People vs. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 20 SW 896).

The Wife

The wife can be guilty of rape, although she cannot commit the offense directly (State v. Fisherty, supra). If she procures that rape be done, or assists in its execution, she can be liable either as co-principal, accessory or accomplice, depending on her participation.

Participation in Rape

The general rule is, all persons present, aiding and abetting another in the commission of rape are guilty as principals and punishable equally with the actual perpetrator of the crime (Lacewell v. Hiatt, CA Ga 173 F. 2d 889). Thus, a driver of a motor vehicle in which a rape is committed, although not directly participating in the offense, may, by his act or conduct, be guilty as a principal (People v. Marx, 125 NE. 719, 291).

One who assists, procures or counsels another to commit rape and is absent when it is committed, is guilty as an accessory before the fact (Clayton v. State, 13 So. 2d 420).

A husband who aids, abets, procures or counsels another to commit rape on his wife may be convicted as principal or accessory before the fact depending on the circumstances (Ex-parte Crawfourd, 120 P. 2d 202, 61 Nev. 152). Likewise, a woman may be guilty of rape if she procures, counsels or aids a man to commit rape on another (State v. Carter, 182 P. 2d 90, 66 Ariz. 52).

To be an aider or abetter, it is immaterial whether a person is disqualified from being the principal actor by reason of age, sex, condition, or class (65 AmJur 2d 776).

Thus, a woman or the husband of the female victim,. who aids, abets, encourages or assists in the commission of the crime may be convicted as a principal (Ibid).

One’s presence at the scene of the crime may be considered in connection with the surrounding facts in determining whether he or she assists, aids or abets in the commission of the crime (People vs. Marx, supra).

A driver who drives an automobile several miles out of the way in a city while his companions forcibly have sexual relations with the prosecutrix at the back of the car, may be sufficient to render him criminally responsible for the act (Ibid).

One who, according to the testimony of the prosecutrix, a girl of 15, held her while another criminally assaulted her,may be convicted of being accessory to the crime of carnal abuse (Warford v. State, 214 Ark 423, 216 Subd. 781 ALR2d 996).

Conspiracy in Rape

In rape, the general rule is that once conspiracy is established, all persons who participate in the crime are coprincipals. All those who coordinate in a rape in an organized band, are guilty for each and all violations (People vs. Toledo, 83 Phi. 777).

If there was conspiracy, where each of the accused cooperated with one another in abusing the victim, each is guilty as principal not only of the rape committed by him but also of that committed by his co-defendants (People vs. Villa, 81 Phil. 193; People vs. Alfara, 91 Phil. 404; People vs. Soriano, 35 SCRA 633).

Where two persons are involved in the commission of a crime, such as robbery, and in the course of which one of them rapes a woman and the other does not make any attempt to prevent the rape, but stands guard while it is going on, the latter may be held liable for the rape to the extent as the one who actually commits the rape (People vs. Galamiton, L-6302, August 25, 1954; U.s. vs. Santos, 17 Phil. 618).

Where a girl was forcibly taken by a group of men, two of whom raped her, the offense was abduction with rape. The defendant who did not himself have intercourse with the girl is guilty of abduction with rape by reason of his taking part in the affair and his conduct in assisting the accomplishment of the rape (People vs. Ching Suy Siong, L-6174, February 28, 1955). Where it is shown, however, that he never encouraged or took part directly or indirectly in the acts complained of, although he was present with the other, he cannot be held liable (Ibid).
Where each of the several defendants had sexual intercourse, through force, with the offended woman whom they had conspired to rape, each of them was held responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also for that committed by the others (People vs. Villa, supra; People vs. Quitain, 99 Phil. 226).

Plainly, there is collective responsibility among the conspirators. Because of this, the crime is viewed as the act of a band (U.S. vs. Bandal, 3 Phil. 89, cited in People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 719).

Thus, where one of the accused tore the victim’s panty and lay on top of her, while the other two accused, one held her legs and the other held her shoulders, all of them are guilty as principals (People vs. Amit, 87 SCRA 793).

Where each of the three accused helped one another in raping the victim, each accused is guilty of the commission of three rapes by conspiracy and three separate penalties shall be imposed (People vs. Babasa, 89 SCRA 672).

In People vs. Reglos, 118 SCRA 344, only one crime of rape was committed. The Court, however, found the three accused guilty of three rapes as co-conspirators, because they helped one another in raping the victim.